**Report on Research Work** 

Project of Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia (EFCA) "Reducing Youth Radicalization in Tajikistan"

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# **Chapter 1: Introduction**

# 1.1 General Information about the Project

As part of the Eurasia Foundation in Central Asia (EFCA) project "Reducing Youth Radicalization in Tajikistan," research on the causes of the radicalization of young people and measures for its prevention was conducted in five regions of Tajikistan, namely: Shurobod, Muminobod, Sharituz, Isfara and Mastchoh. The project itself includes four main components that will help reduce radicalism amongst young people:

- 1. Strengthening the institutional capacity of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the project areas to better understand and address the causes of youth radicalism.
- 2. A study on the causes of radicalism among young people to be circulated amongst local government and NGOs to facilitate a better understanding of the issues.
- 3. The final conference, which will showcase the results of the research and identify the causes of youth radicalism in order to formulate an effective overall strategy to counter it.
- 4. Implementation of youth-led projects in five regions of Tajikistan with the aim of involving young people in social life.

# 1.2. Goals and Objectives

Aims and objectives of the study:

1. determining the scope of the problem of radicalism amongst young people

2. identify necessary measures to reduce the level of radicalization and assess their effectiveness

- 3. determine the causes of the radicalization of young people in the pilot areas
- 4. identify the level of radicalization among youth

5. collecting data about the conditions under which young people live after graduating from high school, particularly their first five years after school

# 1.3. Research methodology

#### The methodology of the study includes the following:

1. **Preparatory Work** – identification of key priorities and the development of a research methodology. This will be followed by the search for local partners in the pilot areas and distribution of questionnaires.

2. Field-work - included four types of activities:

**a) Distribution, completion and collection of the questionnaires**. The first group of questions addressed basic information about the respondents – *Jamoat* (region), sex, age, social status and education. The second group of questions helped clarify the state of radicalization amongst young people in the target area.

**b) On-site interviews** with the local population, particularly with those who are influential community leaders.

c) **The collection of statistical data** for each pilot region from local experts and relevant government agencies.

d) Establishment of **focus groups** with the participation of active young members.

**3. Analysis of data collected** and creation of a final report summarizing the results of the field work.

# **Chapter 2. Main Findings**

## 2.1. Matchoh (New Mastchoh)

#### I. General Information:

#### Specific features of the area:

**First,** the region has ethnic and social specificities. The new district Mastchoh was created during the development Dilvarzinskoy steppe in the 1950s and 1960s. The majority of its residents were from the Mountain Matcha (about 80 percent of the population). This area is different from other the cotton-growing areas of the country (for example, in neighboring Zafarabad region has a much more diverse ethnic composition of the population).

**Second,** although some surveys on this subject have been conducted, it is generally considered that the level of religiosity among the population is higher than in neighboring areas. This is partly due to the continuation of traditional values amongst the population. The Mountain Match was traditionally considered one of the centers of the Mazars with its holy sites attracting pilgrims from all Tajikistan before Soviet times. Thus, the population believed that three (by some accounts five) visits to Hazrat-Burha, five (seven) visits Hazrat Sultan Haji, three visits Iskhokov and seven visits to Abu Moussa Ashgar (in the mountain match) equated to the hajj to Mecca. On the other hand, some researchers emphasize that the higher levels of religiosity are due to the difficulties that were experienced during the involuntary resettlement of the local population to New Mastchoh in the middle of last century. According to the respondents, in some villages the climate and new life killed many children and elderly people.

**Third,** Mountain Match has historically been considered one of the most isolated regions in Tajikistan and was one of the strongholds of resistance to the Soviet authorities during the Basmachi movement (up to mid 1930's). In interviews with local people they consistently emphasized this resistance as a key feature of the local population's mentality. Indeed today many residents of New Mastchoh are members of opposition parties and movements. During the Civil War (1992-7), the area and its population remained outside opposition controlled territory, however it was still considered sympathetic to their cause.

**Fourth**, the region is located along the Tajik-Uzbek border. It is also one of the major cotton growing districts. Accordingly, access to water and land remain major potential conflict-generating factors in the area. Currently, all respondents stressed that the majority of disputes are resolved peacefully. However, at the same time, local residents said at the initial stage of resettlement in Soviet times, some conflicts between Uzbek and Tajik settlers had taken place.

## II. Summary of activities carried out during field-work:

The interviews and questionnaires were carried out in last week of September 2010. Respondents were interviewed in the district's central town of Buston. We used the following methods of sociological research: questionnaires, interviews and focus groups with active young people.

<u>The Task Force investigation</u>: There are 500 young people living in the Mastchoh area. Many are pupils at the upper secondary school or students of the Agricultural College. Some are unemployed or young returning migrants. Interviews were also conducted with NGO staff, clergy and local government.

From 28 September to 30 September the survey was conducted among young people, to determine the level of radicalization and the issues that concern them. A total of 408 questionnaires were completed. The distribution of respondents from the jamoats that make up New Mastcoh district were as follows: Mastchoh - 106 respondents. (26%), Obburdon - 124 (30%), Paldorak - 45 (11%), Avzikent - 60 (15%) and Buston - 73 (18%). Of the young people surveyed 228 (56%) were males and 180 (44%) were female. During the survey we tried to keep a gender balance but this proved difficult. This was due to the fact that few girls continue their education in high school and consequently are less accessible to researchers. The age of the respondents was as follows under 18: 232 (56%) respondents, 18-25 years: 176 people (43%). Of the respondents 219 (54%) were students in school and 181 were students at university and 9 people (2%) were locally employed.

2. **Interviews** – During the same period, a series of detailed interviews with key representatives of local government, the community and civil society. In total there were 17 interviews (list attached).

#### 3. Focus Groups- Focus group with an active youth

#### Venue: Building IOGV Mastchinskogo Area

Number: <u>12 people</u>

In order to determine the relationship between young people and radicalism we conducted a focus group in a building of the district center Mastchoh involving local schoolchildren and students. The subject of discussion was radicalism and how it manifests itself in the area.

#### III. The main comments made by participants in the study:

**First**, almost all participants noted that they had not observed radical sentiments among youth. At the same time, most participants either in their questionnaires or during the interviews could not demonstrate a clear understanding of the term "radicalism".

**Second,** most of them recognized that in the area there are factors that may contribute to the manifestation of radicalism among young people. Regarding the factors themselves and the reasons for the growth of radicalism there was no consensus. At the same time, the majority of the participants stated the following:

lack of education, the alienation of youth from education, the negative impact of the environment, lack of access to information. Respondents told us many young people become radicalized after school due to the fact that they cannot continue learning in universities.
migration of parents from Tajikistan, resulting in teenagers being left without adequate supervision meaning they can become involved in unlawful acts and join radical underground organizations

- some young people complained about the parents themselves, their ban on continued learning for girls and prohibition of marrying without parental consent

- during the discussions in the focus group participants noted the problem of students receiving religious education abroad

- unemployment and particularly amongst youth, lack of places for leisure activities for youth, sports facilities etc

#### Recommendations made by the participants:

• There is a need for leisure activities to be organized for youth.

• They suggested the preparation and publication of a youth newspaper, where they can raise and discuss youth issues.

• Young people want educational workshops and training in various skills that can help them find jobs.

• Respondents requested that public events (sporting, cultural, intellectual, etc.) be held in their areas.

# 2.2 Isfara

# I. General Information:

Isfara is one of the most heavily populated areas of the country (150,000 inhabitants in 2008). According to the survey 43.5% of young people living in the city of Isfara are men and 56.5% are women. The population distribution is as follows, Honobod (28.6%), Kulkant (15.6%), Chilgazi (18.6%), Navgilem (24.3%), Neftobod (18.7%) and Isfara (30.4%). A study among young people was conducted in September-October 2010. The average age of the district is 29.

#### Specific features of the area:

**First**, lack of water and land, characteristic for the whole district, which substantially limits employment opportunities.

**Second,** since independence the region has been the scene of ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Tajik communities several times. At present, the delimitation of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border has been stopped because of the disputed borders. Thus, for the border zone is characterized by a certain level of ethnic tension.

**Third,** it is traditionally believed that the population of the area has a higher level of religiosity than other parts of the country. In recent years, numerous local people have been arrested for membership of banned extremist organizations primarily the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), Bayat and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. At present their influence in the region is difficult to determine. The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan enjoys strong support in the district and offers a more moderate interpretation of political Islam.

# II. Summary of activities carried out during field-work:

In order to determine the attitude of young people to different forms of radicalism in the Isfara region, research was carried out in the following jamoats: Navgilem, Chilgazi, Kulkan, Surkh, Lakkon, Kalachai Dugchi, Vorukh, Kushdehot, and Shurab Muldon.

# III. The main comments made by participants in the study:

**First**, most participants noted the presence of both secular and religious radicalism in the area. The majority of survey participants noted that, in general, radicalism not that prevalent within their society.

**Second,** low living standards, poor education, and high youth unemployment, as well as a large-scale migration were listed as key factors in the radicalization of youth

**Third**, participants described the lack of specialized centers catering for young people. Several respondents noted the existing conflict between the young people who aspire to open such a center and more traditional adults who are not allowing them to do it.

#### Recommendations for the prevention of radicalism among young people:

• There is a need for the provision of employment opportunities for young people through the resumption of economic enterprises.

• There is a need for improvement in the training and education of young people in families and schools.

• Respondents advocated the establishment of sports complexes, recreational and educational centers in the jamoats of the Isfara region.

• Young people seek greater support for their innovative ideas and want to develop their own initiatives. There is also need for centers offering teaching in foreign languages and different skills.

• Young people also requested financial and informational support for those who want to open small businesses.

# 2.3 Sharituz

#### **I.General Information**

Initially, studies were conducted in Sharituz from 27 to 29 September 2010. Sharituz district is located 192 km south of Dushanbe near the borders with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Its total area is 15,000km<sup>2</sup> and its population is 96,7000. The population comprises of mainly Tajiks and Uzbeks with some Russian, Arabs, Tatars, Turkmen and Ukrainians. Over 30% of adults are currently migrant workers in other CIS countries, mostly in Russia.

#### Specific features of the area:

**First,** there is high multi-ethnicity, as most of the population consists of three ethnic communities - Tajiks (in large part coming from Karategin), Uzbeks and Arabs. In the initial period of civil war the area was the scene of an armed confrontation and fighting, accompanied by massive human rights violations with many of the victims coming from the civilian population. From 1992 to 1996 about a third of the local population (mainly representatives of displaced people from Garm) were forced to move to neighboring Afghanistan.

**Second,** as in other pilot areas there is a shortage of water and land resources, which in the past led to inter-ethnic and inter-communal confrontation. At the same time, local communities continue to live fairly isolated from each other. The memories of the injustices incurred during the civil war remain in the memory of the population.

Thus, in all probability in future we may see a growth in ethnic radicalism and regionalism, mainly arising from the issue of access to land and water resources. At the same time it should be

noted that the issue of community relations remains a "taboo" for local residents. The majority of respondents preferred not to touch upon this subject, or limited to general remarks, though in private conversations, agreed with its relevance and importance to their region. Another feature of the region, when compared with the other pilot areas, is the higher level of civil society development. In the area there are numerous active microfinance institutions. Both these agents can be utilized to ensure the more effective implementation of this project.

## **II. Summary of activities carried out during field-work:**

The local population were surveyed and three focus groups were convened. These involved young people, local authorities, representatives of public organizations, including "Shifo" (Dr. Nargiza Shomansurova), "Ehler" (Hubon Safarova), "Bonuvoni fard "(Venus Dzhabarova)," Malik "(Irina Duserova), representatives of law enforcement agencies, including the inspector for delinquency amongst youth in the Shartuzkogo district, Sayidmuhammad Davlatov, a graduate of the Police Academy of the Republic of Tajikistan.

In particular, the participants of the focus groups raised the following questions and issues for discussion:

- the need for clarification of the level of knowledge and awareness of youth about the concepts of "radicalism" and "extremism"
- the level of education for young people in particular jamoats and villages
- possible level of radicalization of local youth;
- age category of young people most affected by radical movements
- the measures taken by state agencies on the prevention of radicalism among young people
- the living conditions of young people after high school graduation
- the problems faced by school leavers in employment and continued employment

#### **III.** The main comments made by participants in the study:

**First**, all participants of the survey denied the existence of radicalism and extremism amongst local youth. At the same time, as in other areas, local respondents as a whole could not answer the question "what is radicalism?"

**Second,** all respondents indicated that the main factors causing the growth of radicalism among young people are the economic and social issues faced by the local population. According to one participant, "we have democracy only in theory, but in fact we have dictatorship, a dictatorship and radicalism, and this creates distrust. Nothing grows on our land, we have no tractors and no spare parts. If we had these then we could raise people's living standards and prevent the radicalization of young people. "

**Third,** Sharituz is a rural area but the level of education and the percentage of young people in higher education remains quite high. As a result young people in the villages are less religious and more drawn to urban, secular culture. At the same time, according to respondents, the opportunities for recreation in the village for young people are extremely limited. Added to this the high levels of unemployment in the area may lead young people into the ranks of radical organizations.

**Fourth,** a significant proportion of respondents commented on "the need to maintain professional work amongst young people, especially girls. In Sharituz this is possible; the vocational college (number 23) can address this issue. They offer training in vehicle maintenance, welding, dress making and sewing."

# 2.4 Shurobod

#### **I.General Information**

Shurobod district is 362 km southeast of Dushanbe (in Kurgan-Tube) on the border area with Afghanistan. It is the 164 km from border with Afghanistan. The total area of 228,000 km<sup>2</sup> and the population is 52,000. Shurobod district is almost mono-ethnic. The majority of those living in the region are ethnically Tajik, but there are some representatives of the Turkic peoples. According to the Deputy Chairman of the Shurobod *Hukumat*, young people comprise approximately 29% of the total population. Of these over 24% are students in the upper grades of secondary school. Around 6.3% of young people go on to higher education establishments. More than 25% are currently migrant workers in other CIS countries, primarily in Russia.

## Specific features of the area:

**First,** Shurobod district is located on the Tajik-Afghan border in a remote mountainous area, making it an area vulnerable to the trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan. In the past few years, there have been cases of the incursion of trafficking groups into the district with the kidnapping and hostage-taking of local residents. According to some reports, a number of local residents were involved in trafficking, many of which later became hostages themselves

**Second**, the involvement of some residents of border villages in smuggling operations from Afghanistan may make them more susceptible to the propaganda of radical organizations

## II. Summary of activities carried out during field-work:

During the course of the study we distributed questionnaires, conducted interviews and held two focus groups. Youth representatives, local government, representatives of social organizations from the villages of Zulmobod, Devdor, Kuhdoman, Safed, Cady and Hodge Galton, all participated in the focus groups. Also in attendance were representatives of law enforcement agencies, including the Head of the Department of Children & Adolescent Rights in Shurobod district Sadulloeva Faizulloevich Ramadan, a graduate of Kulyab Pedagogical University of the Republic of Tajikistan.

#### **III.** The main comments made by participants in the study:

**First**, many respondents linked the potential growth in radicalism in the region to its proximity to Afghanistan and the frequent cases of illegal border crossings. Meanwhile, they argued there is no evidence of the existence of any clandestine group or cell of a radical organization in the area

**Second,** most respondents attributed the possibility of a growth in radicalism with rising youth unemployment. This leaves the young people idle and lacking in direction in their lives.

**Third,** as in other pilot areas, the participants talked about the lack of employment opportunities for youth and the lack of opportunities to engage in social life. According to one participant, "there is a lack of jobs, life is monotonous and there are no clubs, sports facilities or libraries. Among rural youth awareness of the law is limited, especially on radicalism and its implications."

#### Recommendations for the prevention of radicalism among young people:

• The respondents called for the introduction and development of specialized courses tailored to local needs. According to one of the youth representatives "there are many young people, who for good reasons do not attend school and cannot get a profession. Our area is agricultural, there is livestock and horticulture. Why can't I study courses in these fields? This way we can prevent any manifestation of radicalism and crime."

• There is a need for the creation of permanent jobs in the area, as the majority of jobs for local youth are seasonal in nature.

• Young people called for the establishment of information centers for young people. These could train girls and young women in domestic skills and hold seminars to raise the level of legal knowledge, including family law.

# 2.5 Muminobod

#### **I.General Information**

Muminobod district is 321 km southeast of Dushanbe. It covers an area of 880,000 km<sup>2</sup>. The population is 78,000, of which the youth population is 23,000, including 12,000 girls. The number of migrants is around 2,000 of which 60-65% are young people. The average school has 800 to 850 students, with 100 to 120 of these reaching high school. At this time, 40 students from among the graduates are studying at foreign universities. The Muminobod district is almost mono-ethnic. The area is inhabited primarily by Tajiks, with a small number of representatives of the Turkic-speaking people living in several local villages. Muminobod is similar to other mountainous areas of Tajikistan, where the basis of the local economy is agriculture. Yet compared with other pilot districts, the level of migration here is higher. In some villages the vast majority of the local adult population has migrated. In total more than 25-30% of the local population are employed as migrant workers in other CIS countries, mostly in Russia. In some jamoats, migrant workers account for 40% of the population.

#### **II. Summary of activities carried out during field-work:**

Two focus groups were held. Youth representatives, local government, community organization "Sadbarg ", representatives of law enforcement agencies, including the head of the Department of Religious Affairs, Muminobod district, Boronic Dzhamoliddina and the head of the Department of Youth, Sport and Tourism.

With the support of international organizations there have been several projects on the development of local production, mainly in horticulture and bee keeping. A resource centre with computers and internet access has also been established. More than one thousand young people have received training in ICT at this centre. Some young people have also been given the opportunity to go kayaking and canoeing.

#### **III.** The main comments made by participants in the study:

• Muminobod does not differ greatly from neighboring Shurobod.

• At the same time, respondents suggested that in future, radical ideas could penetrate into the area from the outside, both from Kulob, Shurobod and Badakhshan.

• The majority of respondents stressed the need for extensive support for small businesses. As one of them said, "80% of young entrepreneurs and businessmen receive very little, not enough to live on. We have the opportunity to work in rural areas, but entrepreneurs need comprehensive

assistance to protect their rights and enhance their knowledge of land laws." The respondents suggested the organization of training courses adapted to local conditions and needs;

• The respondents denied the existence of clandestine cells in the area, although they did not deny the growth of religious identity. However, none of the respondents ruled out the possibility of such developments in future if the socio-economic status and quality of life in local communities does not improve.

• Some respondents believed that the main reason for the growth of radicalism is unemployment and mass labor migration. As in the neighboring district, in Muminobod employment is only seasonal. According to one person surveyed, "I live in a village of 12,800 people of which half are young people. They are all engaged in seasonal work, three or four months of work when the harvest being gathered and then six to seven months a year with no work. We need to help to youth find more permanent employment in the district."

# 3.0 Concluding Remarks

#### As mentioned above, the objectives of this study are two-fold:

**Firstly**, to provide an overview of the situation in each of the pilot areas in order to determine the approximate level and the potential for radicalization of local youth

**Secondly**, based on the data collected in each of the districts, to identify strategies and methods to prevent the growth of radicalism among youth.

#### Key findings:

In all the pilot areas the radicalization of young people is not extensive. This means that the majority of local youth are not involved in politics and like most the population they eschew political activity. This situation can be attributed to the effects of the so-called "post-war syndrome", which is characteristic of many societies undergoing post-conflict transformations. In other words the population prefers not to pay attention to their economic hardship and the lack of welfare support in order to preserve stability and peace.

At the same time, in all the pilot districts, the overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that the possibility of radicalization of both youth and society in general does exist. However, the prospects for the growth of youth radicalism differ rather significantly in each of the pilot areas. In Muminobod and Shurobod the growth of youth extremism is a relatively distant prospect. However in New Mastchoh and Isfara there have already been arrests of members of radical organizations. At present in these regions the rise of radical organizations is proceeding secretively and it is impossible to determine their actual level of support and membership.

# If we talk about the nature of radicalization in each of the pilot areas, they can be divided into two sub-groups:

**Firstly**, in New Matchoh, Isfara and to a lesser extent Sharituz, the growth of radicalism in the form of religious fundamentalism and ethnic intolerance is more pronounced. In these areas radical ideologies and institutions already exist and have some influence over young people. Groups disseminate leaflets and carry out other activities of a clandestine nature. We can make this conclusion based on the interviews, surveys, and from publicly available information from the press and law enforcement bodies.

**Secondly**, in Shurobod and Muminobod there has not been a marked increase in the influence of radical ideologies and groups amongst young people. However in Shurobod young people have

been actively involved in criminal activities resulting from close ties with Afghan warlords on the other side of Panj river. Therefore there is concern (expressed more than once during the surveys and interviews) that this dependence can be exploited by radical foreign organizations.

#### 3.1 Conclusions:

**First,** the vast majority of respondents cited socio-economic factors as the main reason for the growth of radicalism. Indeed, international experience suggests that the rise in unemployment and the marginalization of the population are key factors in the growth of extremism among young people, especially in Muslim countries. From this perspective, all the pilot areas can be considered equally susceptible to the threat extremism among the youth.

**Second**, the shortcomings of the educational system and poor levels of religious education contribute to radicalization. This factor plays a significant role and was noted by almost all participants in the interviews.

**Third**, weaknesses in public policies towards young people were often mentioned by respondents. In Mastchoh and Isfara, in particular, there is public discontent at the imposition of a uniform dress code, a ban on the hijab and other restrictive government policies. Some parents in Isfara district will not let their children go to school because of these secular school uniforms, in their opinion, this does not meet with the canons of Islam.

**Separately, we should mention the factor of labor migration.** According to many of the respondents it can lead to the disintegration of the family. Young people grow up lacking supervision increasing the appeal of criminal or religious organizations. On the other hand, many young workers return home and begin to behave in a way that quickly brings them into conflict with local traditional members of society. This growing conflict between youth and the rest of society was noted by many respondents both directly and indirectly. Meanwhile, the experience of other Muslim countries also suggests that such a conflict leads to further marginalization of young people and as a result can trigger the growth of extremism.

Also note that the situation in each area is unique and there are differences in the level of religiosity and social activities undertaken by youth. For example in New Mastchoh there are jamoats where respondents reported that all events (weddings) are carried out according to strict Islamic canons but in other neighboring jamoats (Avzikent) dance parties are held. As such this study found no direct link between the level of religiosity and the radicalization of youth. Thus, in Sharituz arrests of activists and members of the underground organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir took place in Spark which was traditionally no more religious than the neighboring jamoats.

It follows that the radicalism and extremism are complex phenomena, which can take many forms, from ethnic and religious aversion to religious fundamentalism. This study concludes that the triggers for radicalization are primarily socio-economic in nature. Youth extremism can result when young people see no legal ways to solve their problems and to secure their future.

#### 3.2 Recommendations for preventing the growth of radicalism among young people

#### Methods for combating radicalism:

**First**, **support initiatives** aimed at developing local small businesses and entrepreneurship skills among youth. This would include not only economic support but also related educational initiatives.

**Second**, **capacity building** through vocational education as well as supporting NGOs who operate in the pilot areas in supporting young people's development. In most cases, the respondents insisted on the adaptation of such projects to local conditions and the needs of the young people themselves.

**Third, advocacy** aimed at protecting the rights of young people. In this regard, young people offered to support an initiative to create *Youth Resource Center in jamoats*, where the infrastructure in the form of buildings, as well as the possibility of further financial support from local businesses, already exists. These centers would have computers with Internet access, new books and periodicals. In Mastchoh and Isfara respondents suggested the idea of publishing a weekly periodical newspaper. This would also involve promoting the establishment of local NGOs and civic groups who would implement these youth projects. This would necessarily entail training for these organizations.

The results of the field-work and surveys contradict the popular belief that high religiosity and radicalism are manifested specifically and exclusively among poorer people. New Matchoh and Isfara display higher levels of religiosity and politicization of youth than in the relatively poorer Shurobod and Muminobod districts.

The most likely reason for this that the better off the community, the stronger the desire to become more active local civil society is. Currently, especially in Isfara, a group of young people has emerged, consisting primarily of entrepreneurs, returning migrants and students, who want to change the situation in their areas for the better. However, in a significant proportion of cases their initiatives have been hampered by bureaucracy and the indifference of local authorities. Thus, in some cases, for example in the jamoats Vorukh and Chorkuh, the initiatives of local young people and entrepreneurs for the creation of various sports and cultural facilities have not been implemented due to problems with land and bureaucracy. This marginalization could cause further radicalization of young people. These initiatives need support. In Mastchoh and Isfara many respondents named local entrepreneurs willing to sponsor such events and initiatives. However, due to a lack of government support and a weak civil society these projects have not been implemented. So supporting youth civic initiatives and local groups of civil activists (especially among youth) is an important strategy in combating the phenomenon of youth radicalism and extremism.

**Fourth,** in almost all the pilot areas young people complained about the lack of leisure facilities, especially in urban areas, where a large number of young migrants, who have just returned from Russia, reside. Indeed in Isfara, Mastcoh and Shurobod youth suggested the idea of creating sports facilities, entertainment and learning centers in some jamoats. Many respondents (especially from among the local intelligentsia) noted the shortage of cultural institutions, especially libraries, clubs etc.

To conclude, the results indicate an increasing marginalization of youth in the district surveyed. The study also demonstrated the presence of socio-economic, cultural and political factors which may lead to the growth of radicalization among young people. This suggests that Tajikistani society today is going through a complex process of transformation, which may cause further conflict, depending on the policy of the government, local civil society and international organizations.

#### Appendix I. Text of the Questionnaire


#### Саволнома

# Дар мавзуъ:и «Шинохт ва роњњои пешгирї намудани тундгарої дар байни љавонон вобаста ба сиёсати давлатии кор бо љавонон»

- 1. Мафњуми тундгароиро чі гуна шарњ медињед.
- 2. Кадом намудњои тундгароиро мушоњида кардаед.
- 3. Оё дар мањали зисти Шумо тундгарої дар байни љавонон мушоњида мешавад?
- 4. Омилњои барангезандаи тундгароиро, ки мушоњида кардаед, номбар кунед.
- 5. Аз ин сабабњо бештар кадомњо боиси тундгарої дар байни љавонон шуда метавонанд:
  - сифати пасти таълим дар мактаб ва муассисањои дигари таълим;
  - набудани шароитва муассисањои фароѓатию варзиші дар мањал;
  - сатњи пасти зиндагї;
  - набудани љои кори доимї;
  - фаъолияти назаррас надоштани созмонњои марбути кор бо љавонон.
- 6. Боз кадом сабањоро боиси ба тундгарої ру овардани љавонон мешуморед.
- Ба назари Шумо тундгарої дар кадоме аз ин синну соли љавонон бештар ба назар мерасад:
  - 16-20 сола;
  - 21-25 сола;
  - 26 30 сола.
- 8. Оё тундгароиро аз тарафи љавонон шахсан мушоњида кардаед?
  - агар мушоњида кардаед, сабабашро дар чі медонед?
  - агар мушоњида накардаед, сабабашро дар чї медонед?
- 9. Дар пешгирии зуњуроти тундгарої дар байни љавонон ба назари Шумо кадоме аз ин ќишрњои љомеъа бештар таъстр гузошта метавонанд?
  - оила;
  - муассисањои таълимї;
  - созмонњои кор бо љавонон;

- шўрои куњансолон;
- маќомоти њифзи њуќуќ.
- 10. Зуњуроти тундгарої дар байни љавонони касбу кори гуногун дошта бештар дар кадоме аз ин гурўњьо ба назар мерасад?
  - љавонони дар муассисањои таълими дунявї тањсил дошта;
  - љавонони бекор;
  - тољирони љавон;
  - љавонони аз муњољирати мењнатї баргашта;
  - шогирдони мадрасањои динї ё таълими ѓайрирасмии динї гиранда;
  - љавонони дар хориљ а аз љумњурї тањсил карда.
- 11. Ба назари Шумо оила дар пешгирии тундгароии љавонон чї корњоеро анљом дода метавонад?
- 12. Муассисањои таълимиї чї?
- 13. Ањли љомеъа чї сање гузошта метавонад?
- 14. Мисолеро зикр кунед, ки Шумо шоњиди тундгароии њамсолонатон шудаед.
- 15. Барои пешгирии њама гуна зуњуроти тундгарої дар байни љавонон чї мулоњиза ва пешнињодњоро тавсия медињед?

Мураттиб: Саидањмад ЌАЛАНДАРОВ



APPENDIX III. Number of men and women in Isfara and rural sub-districts of Isfara region

